arXiv:2510.03548v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: AI-based talking-head videoconferencing systems reduce bandwidth by sending a compact pose-expression latent and re-synthesizing RGB at the receiver, but this latent can be puppeteered, letting an attacker hijack a victim's likeness in real time. Because every frame is synthetic, deepfake and synthetic video detectors fail outright. To address this security problem, we exploit a key observation: the pose-expression latent inherently contains biometric information of the driving identity. Therefore, we introduce the first biometric leakage defense without ever looking at the reconstructed RGB video: a pose-conditioned, large-margin contrastive encoder that isolates persistent identity cues inside the transmitted latent while cancelling transient pose and expression. A simple cosine test on this disentangled embedding flags illicit identity swaps as the video is rendered. Our experiments on multiple talking-head generation models show that our method consistently outperforms existing puppeteering defenses, operates in real-time, and shows strong generalization to out-of-distribution scenarios.