Germany orders more P-8A Poseidons as Franco-German maritime aircraft programme stalls
European strategic autonomy faces reality as proven US capabilities trump cooperation rhetoric
Germany appears set to expand its Boeing P-8A Poseidon fleet from eight to potentially twelve aircraft, based on budget allocations and naval planning documents released this year. The move would mark another nail in the coffin of the Franco-German Maritime Airborne Warfare System (MAWS) programme and highlight a broader trend of European nations choosing proven American military systems over ambitious but troubled European alternatives.
Budget documents suggest Germany will request €2.8 billion in commitment appropriations for P-8A procurement between 2028 and 2032, a significant increase from the €700 million previously allocated. The Bundeswehr's latest naval strategy, Kurs Marine 2025, indicates that Germany's P-8A inventory could reach 8-12 aircraft by 2035, classified alongside drone systems as "Reconnaissance & Underwater Warfare" capabilities.
This expansion comes as Germany receives its first P-8A Poseidon this year, with the aircraft bearing German colours and markings already revealed at Boeing's Seattle facility. German naval crews are training alongside American counterparts in Florida, learning systems that Commander Phillip W. describes as "far ahead" of their ageing P-3C Orions, offering "fully digitised" capabilities with real-time data transfers and state-of-the-art satellite communications.
Yet this procurement success story masks a diplomatic failure. The decision to buy more P-8As effectively signals the end of MAWS, a programme launched in 2017 with considerable political fanfare as part of Franco-German defence cooperation renewal under Emmanuel Macron and Angela Merkel.
The MAWS programme's slow death
The Maritime Airborne Warfare System was supposed to epitomise European strategic autonomy in action. Announced alongside the Future Combat Air System (FCAS) and other ambitious joint programmes, MAWS promised to develop a cutting-edge replacement for both Germany's P-3C Orions and France's Breguet Atlantique 2 aircraft by 2035.
Instead, it became another cautionary tale about European defence cooperation. When Germany announced in 2021 its intention to purchase five P-8A Poseidons through a Foreign Military Sales programme, French officials learned about it from American defence announcements rather than their German partners. Florence Parly, then French Minister of the Armed Forces, later admitted that Paris had been kept completely in the dark.
France's response revealed the depth of the rift. Paris offered Germany four upgraded Atlantique 2 aircraft to bridge the capability gap, complete with crew training and maintenance support, explicitly designed to keep MAWS alive. Berlin refused. By November 2021, the Franco-German study platform established at Thales premises in Vélizy had been dismantled, with industry sources describing the programme as effectively dead.
German defence officials defended the P-8A purchase as an "interim solution" necessitated by the early retirement of P-3C Orions and MAWS delays. But French observers never believed this characterisation. They recognised what the evidence now confirms, when security needs conflict with European cooperation rhetoric, operational capability wins.
The pattern extends beyond MAWS. Spain has recently ruled out F-35 purchases in favour of investing in FCAS development, while complaints about French dominance threaten that programme's future. Germany's own relationship with European cooperation programmes shows consistent preferences for proven alternatives when available.
Europe's cooperation problem
The MAWS failure exemplifies deeper structural problems plaguing European defence cooperation. These programmes consistently founder on three predictable obstacles, industrial workshare disputes, competing operational requirements, and the political impossibility of accepting dependence on partners' technologies.
The Franco-German Future Combat Air System faces similar challenges. Despite €3.2 billion allocated for development, disputes between Dassault, Airbus, and Spanish partner Indra have delayed Phase 2 contracts. Eric Trappier, Dassault's CEO, recently hinted at potential French withdrawal, arguing that France possesses the expertise while "sharing this expertise with Spaniards and Germans".
Such tensions are not new. The Eurocopter Tiger helicopter programme nearly collapsed in 1986 due to spiralling costs before being relaunched, and recent reports suggest Germany may yet withdraw from the Tiger Mk 3 upgrade programme. The pattern reflects fundamental disagreements about technological sovereignty, export controls, and industrial returns that make sustained cooperation extremely difficult.
European programmes also suffer from extended development timelines that create capability gaps requiring interim solutions. FCAS aims for operational capability by 2040, MAWS was targeting 2035, and even these dates appear optimistic given current difficulties. Meanwhile, security threats demand immediate responses that only existing systems can provide.
This creates a vicious cycle where European cooperation failures strengthen the case for American alternatives, which then provide such superior capability that future cooperation becomes even more difficult to justify.
Why the P-8A wins everywhere
The P-8A Poseidon's success stems from addressing precisely the problems that plague European alternatives. Based on the proven Boeing 737-800 commercial aircraft, it leverages massive economies of scale and established supply chains. With 172 aircraft delivered globally and more than 660,000 flight hours logged, it offers operational credibility that developmental programmes cannot match.
Nine countries now operate or have ordered P-8As, the United States, India, Australia, United Kingdom, Norway, New Zealand, South Korea, Germany, and Canada. This global user base creates network effects that make the aircraft increasingly attractive. German crews training in Scotland with British operators, shared maintenance facilities, common spare parts inventories, and seamless NATO interoperability provide operational advantages that no European alternative can match.
The aircraft's capabilities justify its popularity. Flying at 41,000 feet with a maximum speed of 490 knots, the P-8A can reach areas of interest faster than propeller-driven alternatives while maintaining four-hour loiter times over mission areas. Its sensor suite includes synthetic aperture radar, inverse synthetic aperture radar, electronic support measures, and comprehensive acoustic systems optimised for submarine detection and surface surveillance.
For Germany, facing expanded NATO commitments in the North Sea and Baltic, these capabilities matter more than European industrial policy. Russian submarine activity has increased dramatically since 2022, requiring immediate responses rather than systems that might be available in a decade. The P-8A provides those responses today, with full interoperability with allied forces already operating the same systems.
European alternatives remain conceptual. Airbus launched its A321 Maritime Patrol Aircraft concept in late 2024, beginning a 24-month risk reduction study. Even optimistic projections suggest European alternatives are years away from matching P-8A capabilities, assuming development programmes avoid the problems that have plagued other cooperation efforts.
Strategic autonomy meets security needs
Germany's P-8A expansion highlights fundamental tensions between European strategic autonomy aspirations and practical security requirements. The concept of strategic autonomy, championed particularly by France, envisions Europe developing independent military capabilities to reduce dependence on American systems and guarantees.
Yet when nations face immediate security challenges, proven capabilities trump strategic considerations. Norway ordered P-8As specifically to counter Russian activities in the Arctic, with officials explicitly linking the aircraft to NATO defence requirements. Major General Rolf Folland described the P-8A as providing "modern and important capacity in the north" working alongside F-35s to defend Norwegian territory.
This reveals strategic autonomy's central contradiction. European nations want independence from American systems in principle but require American capabilities in practice. The gap between aspiration and reality grows wider as security challenges intensify and European alternatives fail to materialise on relevant timelines.
The Ukraine conflict has accelerated this dynamic. European defence spending has increased substantially, but much of it flows to American contractors providing immediate capabilities rather than European companies developing future systems. Poland's massive military modernisation programme relies heavily on American equipment, while Baltic states prioritise interoperability with US forces over European industrial development.
Even France, strategic autonomy's most vocal advocate, struggles with these contradictions. Paris chose to go alone on MAWS after German defection, considering adaptations of Dassault's Falcon 10X business jet for maritime patrol missions. Yet this approach abandons European cooperation in favour of national solutions, undermining the broader strategic autonomy project.
Implications for European defence integration
Germany's P-8A decision illuminates a harsh truth, European strategic autonomy cannot survive contact with military reality.
The pattern extends far beyond maritime patrol aircraft. Eastern European nations, facing existential Russian threats, choose American systems that integrate seamlessly with US forces and provide immediate deterrent value over European programmes that might deliver capability sometime next decade. The European Defence Fund struggles to compete with American procurement programmes that offer proven systems, established support networks, and operational credibility earned through continuous combat use.
This creates a devastating feedback loop. Each European programme failure justifies American purchases, reducing market demand for European alternatives and making future cooperation programmes even more difficult to sustain. The result threatens to relegate European defence industry to niche capabilities whilst core military systems remain American.
The political implications prove equally damaging. European strategic autonomy was conceived as military capability married to geopolitical positioning—reducing dependence on increasingly unreliable American partnerships. Yet the practical effect of choosing American systems deepens integration with US military structures regardless of political rhetoric about independence.
Consider the irony, European nations proclaim strategic autonomy whilst training their pilots in Florida, maintaining their aircraft through American contractors, and operating within American-designed tactical frameworks. Each P-8A purchase makes European forces more interoperable with American systems and more dependent on American industrial support.
The tragedy is that European defence cooperation was never impossible—merely difficult. The continent possesses the industrial capacity, technological expertise, and financial resources to develop competitive alternatives. What it lacks is the political patience to endure the lengthy development cycles that producing world-class military systems requires.
Instead, European governments consistently prioritise immediate capability over long-term independence, then express surprise when dependence deepens rather than diminishes. Germany's P-8A expansion represents not procurement pragmatism but strategic surrender—acceptance that European cooperation cannot deliver when security matters most.
The implications reach beyond defence policy to fundamental questions about European integration under pressure. When cooperation rhetoric meets operational necessity, pragmatic choices typically prevail. The challenge for strategic autonomy advocates is developing alternatives that compete with proven American systems before security pressures render such choices academic.
Current evidence suggests this will prove impossible. European defence cooperation faces structural impediments—industrial competition, national sovereignty reflexes, extended development timelines—that may be insurmountable given immediate security pressures. American systems continue improving through massive investment and operational experience that European alternatives cannot match.
Germany's choice therefore represents more than maritime patrol procurement. It signals European acknowledgement that strategic autonomy remains an aspiration rather than achievable policy when military capability determines national survival in an increasingly dangerous world.
