Mashable 09月03日
超20款VPN应用共享代码,用户隐私面临潜在风险
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一项新研究揭示,Google Play商店中超过20款VPN应用程序尽管声称独立运营,却共享相同的代码库和基础设施。这些应用合计拥有7亿用户,占据了平台下载量前100名VPN中的20席。研究发现这些应用可追溯至三个VPN家族,其中一些与俄罗斯和中国有关联。此外,研究还指出了严重的隐私和安全漏洞,包括重用登录凭证、使用过时的加密算法以及容易受到中间人攻击。研究人员建议应用商店引入安全审计徽章,以增强用户对VPN应用的信任度。

🚨 **集中化的代码与基础设施:** 研究发现,Google Play商店中超过20款VPN应用,尽管对外宣称独立,却共享相同的代码库和基础设施。这些应用的总用户数高达7亿,显示出一种潜在的集中化控制模式,这与VPN服务应有的去中心化和独立性理念相悖,可能隐藏着用户数据被统一收集和处理的风险。

🌐 **与特定国家关联的风险:** 这些VPN应用可追溯至三个主要的VPN家族,其中部分家族被发现与俄罗斯和中国存在关联。这种关联性可能引发用户对数据隐私和安全性的担忧,尤其是在涉及跨境数据传输和国家监管的敏感领域,用户数据可能面临被特定国家政府获取或滥用的风险。

🔒 **严峻的安全与隐私漏洞:** 研究揭示了多项严重的安全隐患,包括部分应用重用ShadowSocks的登录凭证、采用过时的加密算法,以及所有三个VPN家族均易受“盲点中间人攻击”。这意味着攻击者可能在用户不知情的情况下拦截和窃取敏感信息,对用户的在线通信安全构成了直接威胁。

📈 **应用商店审核机制的挑战:** 研究者指出,应用商店在验证VPN服务提供商的真实身份及其开发背景方面能力有限,审核重点多在于恶意软件检测和隐私侵犯。这使得不透明或存在安全隐患的VPN应用得以在平台上广泛传播,用户难以辨别其可靠性。因此,引入如“安全审计徽章”等认证机制被认为是提升透明度和用户信任度的有效途径。

A new study has uncovered that more than 20 VPN apps on the Google Play Store share the same codebases and infrastructure, despite presenting themselves as independent services. Together, these apps account for 20 of the 100 most-downloaded VPNs on the platform, with a staggering 700 million users.

The findings raise serious questions about trust and transparency in an industry built on privacy — and highlight how poorly app stores may vet VPN providers.

The research, conducted by The Citizen Lab at the University of Toronto, traced these apps back to just three VPN families, some with ties to Russia and China. Investigators used business filings and forensic analysis of Android APKs to uncover the hidden connections.

Family A was tied to Innovative Connecting, Autumn Breeze, and Lemon Clove, and included major players like Turbo VPN, VPN Proxy Master, and Snap VPN — all of which shared identical code and assets. Family B, linked to Matrix Mobile, ForeRaya Technology, and Wildlook Tech, operated XY VPN, 3X VPN, and Melon VPN, which used the same VPN addresses. Family C, made up of Fast Potato and Free Connected Limited, controlled Fast Potato VPN and X-VPN.

Beyond a lack of transparency, the study also found serious security flaws. Some apps reused login credentials for ShadowSocks, a tool for bypassing firewalls. Others relied on outdated encryption algorithms, leaving users more exposed. Most concerning of all, all three VPN families were vulnerable to blind on-path attacks — meaning hackers on the same network, such as public Wi-Fi, could intercept traffic without either party realizing it.

The researchers noted that app stores have limited ability to verify who operates a VPN or how it’s built, since their review systems are largely focused on malware detection and privacy violations. As a remedy, they suggested introducing a security audit badge for VPNs — a certification that could give users more confidence in the apps they choose.

The specifics of Google’s app review process remain unclear. According to a support page, developers must provide a privacy policy, disclose whether the app contains ads, obtain a content rating, and share the app’s privacy and security practices with Google in order to pass review.

Google did not immediately respond to our request for comment on its verification practices.

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相关标签

VPN 隐私 安全 Google Play 代码共享 用户数据 中间人攻击 应用商店审核 Privacy Security Google Play Store Code Sharing User Data Man-in-the-Middle Attack App Store Review
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