Roads in Longyearbyen, the most northerly settlement on the planet, are usually blocked only by a resurgent reindeer population. On August 14th the few thoroughfares in the small capital of Svalbard were set instead to be jammed by visiting dignitaries. Norway’s prime minister, Jonas Store, along with the crown prince and other officials will gather for a ceremony marking 100 years of Norwegian sovereignty. Norway, a NATO member, is keen to emphasise the importance of the century-old Svalbard treaty that establishes its rule in this part of the far north.
Geopolitical competition in the region is soaring. On August 15th Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin, the presidents of America and Russia, are due to meet in Alaska. They will discuss ending the war in Ukraine, at the first bilateral summit between the leaders of the two countries in years. Both presidents have asserted their wider interest in expanding their influence in the Arctic, too.
Svalbard, as a European outpost in the Arctic, had drawn little geopolitical attention in recent decades. But intelligence chiefs, military figures and politicians are newly preoccupied by it. Svalbard’s governor, Lars Fause, says “enormous interest” has built up since Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, and after NATO expanded to include Sweden and Finland. Since Mr Trump suggested America would take control of Greenland from Denmark, earlier this year, attention has been supercharged. Europeans, especially, are keen to assert their Arctic presence more effectively. Norway’s first national security strategy, published this spring, set out bluntly that “national control in Svalbard is to be strengthened”.
European disquiet is mostly because of Russia. Britain’s foreign secretary, David Lammy, visited Svalbard in May, promoting close defence and intelligence ties with Norway and mutual efforts to track “hostile activity” in the Arctic, an obvious reference to Russia. Two years ago Russia designated Norway as unfriendly, limiting diplomatic relations, because of Norway’s support for Ukraine. Norway’s intelligence chief, Nils Andreas Stensones, calls his country the “eyes and ears” of NATO in the far north, and spoke recently in London of Russia’s ever more aggressive foreign policy.
He notes that Russia accuses NATO of “wanting to militarise the Arctic”. Mr Putin said as much in March at an event in Murmansk, on the Arctic coast. Russia has also alleged that Norway makes military use of Svalbard, in contravention of the treaty. Norway denies it.
Russia itself is re-opening or establishing new civilian and military bases in the wider Arctic, including in relatively close-by Franz Josef Land. Russia has the biggest military and civilian presence, including a large fleet of ice-breaker ships. It is also co-operating in the region with China, which has declared itself a “near Arctic” power. Russia also has ambitions to develop the region as a shipping route for exports of oil and gas to Asia.
Svalbard’s location midway between Greenland, mainland Norway and Russia is of growing geopolitical significance. The terms of the Svalbard treaty forbid any military structures there, but Norway is increasingly keen to assert its sovereignty.
Russia and NATO have the most extensive networks of military and civilian bases in the Arctic. Russia is especially concerned to protect the home port for its nuclear-armed naval fleet at Murmansk, on the Kola peninsula.
Russia is also keen to develop bases that could also support ships, including those transporting oil and gas, along the Northern Sea Route from Europe to Asia.
In future, other sea routes in the Arctic may also become viable, opening up the region both for civilian trade and for increased naval activity.
That depends, in turn, on how quickly the sea ice retreats in the Arctic, as a result of climate change. The past four decades have already seen a dramatic reduction.
Norway’s intelligence chief suggests Russia’s Arctic efforts are also influenced by the effects of the Ukraine war. The expansion of NATO means that Russia is less free to carry out military and other activity in the Baltic Sea. To compensate, it appears to want more opportunities in the Arctic. The relative proximity of Svalbard to an important port for its nuclear-armed naval fleet on the Kola Peninsula of the Russian mainland is also a worry for Russia.
A second Russian concern is that Svalbard gives Western powers an intelligence advantage. A large array of Starlink receivers and other antennae on mountains above Longyearbyen are used for downloading data, for civilian ends, from transpolar satellites. Although the Svalbard treaty forbids Norway from using such an installation for military purposes, Russia occasionally asserts that military activity nonetheless takes place. Norway denies it.
Could heated words one day turn to hostile action? NATO powers suggest it may already be happening. There is evidence of Russian sabotage in the Arctic. In 2022 Russian trawlers were tracked as they criss-crossed an undersea communications cable that connected mainland Norway to Svalbard. The cable was cut near to Svalbard, following a similar incident near to the mainland the year before.
Damage to
undersea cable
Jan 2022
Damage to
undersea cable
Jan 2022
Some worry that could have been a harbinger of greater military threats. In November the head of German intelligence, Bruno Kahl, described a scenario in which Russia would test NATO members’ commitment to common defence, Article 5, by launching a hybrid attack on Svalbard. Some incidents are suspicious but not proven as harassment. In July, for example, commercial airliners approaching Svalbard reported interference in their GPS signals.
Svalbard’s position is both advantageous and awkward for Norway. Crucially, Russia recognises the Svalbard treaty granting Norway ownership, even if the Soviet Union, in the 1940s, briefly tried to bully its neighbour to abandon it in favour of a bilateral arrangement between the two countries. Norway refused. The awkward bit is that the same treaty grants nationals of other countries the rights to settle and exploit territory on Svalbard. That includes Russia. A Russian mining company, Arktikugol, has for decades populated and run a town, Barentsburg, just 40km from Longyearbyen. A handful of other tiny Russian-run mining settlements have also existed.
One challenge for Norway is to preserve Longyearbyen as a viable economic outpost, and crucially to maintain a year-round population there. All residents in Svalbard are temporary—because of limited medical facilities, the very young and elderly are discouraged from living there. For most of the past century the territory was mostly used for coal mining. But on June 30th the last Norwegian coal shaft was closed. One Norwegian in Svalbard, Svein Jonny Albrigsten, a miner who has lived on the island for 50 years, points out that Russia won’t close its own coal mine at Barentsburg. He argues that as Russia and China show greater interest in exploiting Arctic natural resources, that will eventually spur Western countries to resume mining in Svalbard, too.
More likely, however, Norway will double down on making Svalbard a centre for research and tourism. Longyearbyen already hosts Norwegian and international scientists in a research centre. Some miners may be re-employed in building work, as more and better residential structures go up, in part to deal with the effects of melting permafrost. In the long-run, retreating sea-ice in the Arctic may also bring a surge in shipping in the Arctic, including at Svalbard.
Conflict in Svalbard is far from likely, even if increasing competition for influence in the region is guaranteed. For the sleepy settlement of Longyearbyen, on the most extreme edge of the map, ever more visits from military, political and intelligence officials are certain. Interest from neighbouring Russia, too, is only going to grow.■
